TITLE: EGYPT HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994 AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DATE: FEBRUARY 1995 EGYPT According to its Constitution, Egypt is a social democracy in which Islam is the state religion. The President is Hosni Mubarak, who was reelected unopposed to a third 6-year term by the People's Assembly in 1993. The President appoints the Cabinet which is responsible to him. His party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), has governed since its establishment in 1978. It commands large majorities in the popularly elected People's Assembly and the Shura (Consultative) Council. One opposition party is represented in the People's Assembly; the others boycotted the previous People's Assembly election in 1990 and are not represented. There are several security services in the Ministry of Interior, two of which are primarily involved in combating extremist violence: the State Security Investigations Sector (SSIS), which conducts investigations and interrogates detainees; and the Central Security Force (CSF), which enforces curfews, bans on public demonstrations, and conducts paramilitary operations against terrorists. Egypt is a developing country with a mixed economy dominated by the public sector. Agriculture, an almost entirely private sector, remains the largest single employer. Remittances from approximately 2 million Egyptians working in the Gulf countries are the largest source of foreign currency earnings. In the past 4 years, the Government has enacted significant economic reforms, which have reduced the budget deficit and stabilized the exchange rate, but has made slow progress on other reforms, including privatization. The Constitution provides for various human rights, including a multiparty political system, regular elections, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, freedom of opinion, and the right to peaceable private assembly. However, the Emergency Law continues to restrict many basic rights. There continued to be widespread human rights violations in 1994. The security services and terrorist groups remained locked in a cycle of violence. Security forces committed human rights abuses in their campaign against terrorist groups, but frequently victimized noncombatants as well. Under the Emergency Law, abuses included the widespread torture of detainees in security cases, the Government's continued failure to punish those responsible for torture, arbitrary arrest, and detention without trial, and the use of military courts to try suspected terrorists. The Government continued to arrest and harass journalists and lawyers who defended accused Islamists. Terrorists bombed banks, attacked and killed government officials, security forces, Egyptian Christians, and foreign tourists, and were responsible for the majority of civilian deaths in 1994. The ruling NDP dominates the political scene to such an extent that, as a practical matter, the citizens do not have a meaningful ability to change their government. The Government continues to restrict substantially basic rights of expression and the press. Women and Egyptian Christians face discrimination based on tradition and some aspects of the law. RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing In 1994 the state security police were implicated in several extrajudicial killings. In virtually all cases, the Government has not adequately investigated or explained the causes of death. On February 1, police raided a house in Cairo, killing 7 suspected terrorists. The police maintain that a 3-hour shootout began when one of the suspects inside the house opened fire on the approaching police. However, witnesses later told the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) that the shootout lasted a matter of seconds, followed by a pause, and a later burst of gunfire after the police had entered the house. One policeman was wounded in the incident. The mother of one of those killed filed a complaint against the police, alleging that security forces had executed her son. She retracted her complaint after the police detained her for 12 hours. On February 14, security forces shot dead three alleged extremists in a Cairo neighborhood. According to the Ministry of Interior, the police acted in self-defense after the suspects opened fire on a patrol in an alley. However, witnesses claimed that they observed the police arrest four suspects, place three of them into a police truck, and later heard suspected gunfire from within the truck. Witnesses further claimed that they observed security officers dump three bodies from the truck onto the street and place guns and ammunition purportedly belonging to the dead suspects near the bodies. Local human rights monitors who inspected the scene concluded that the traces of blood on the street were too small to be consistent with the Government's claim that the suspects were shot on the spot in an exchange of fire. No information is available concerning the fourth detainee. On April 26, officials of the state security police arrested Islamist lawyer Abdel Hareth Madani at his office in Cairo. Madani died in police custody at a hospital early on April 27. The state security police did not inform Madani's family until May 6. The police did not allow Madani's family to view the body, which was transported in a sealed coffin to his village for burial. The Government initially claimed that Madani had died of an asthma attack, despite claims by morgue workers that they observed puncture wounds and bruises on Madani's body while preparing it for burial. In May the Ministry of Justice announced that it would conduct an investigation of Madani's death. At year's end, the results of the ongoing investigation had not been made public. The Minister of Interior has nonetheless publicly denied any police wrongdoing in Madani's death, maintaining that Madani died of natural causes. Also in April, local human rights monitors claim that Mohammed Abdel Hamid Hassan died in Abu Zabaal prison near Cairo, following beatings by a prison officer. Hassan was serving a 3-year sentence for sale of drugs; his body was allegedly thrown from a fourth-floor window to conceal the cause of death. The Prosecutor General's office investigated the case and charged the officer with Hassan's death. The officer was released on bail, pending further investigation. In August Fateh al-Bab Abdel Manem died at a police station in the Cairo suburb of Helwan, following his arrest on drug charges. He was detained along with his wife and son. According to human rights monitors, Abdel Manem died after 12 continuous hours of torture, witnessed by his son. The autopsy report indicates cause of death as cerebral hemorrhage and "major wounds to the body." The Prosecutor General's office has stated it will investigate the death but at year's end had not made public its findings. In 1993 at least 12 persons died from injuries sustained while in police custody, and 2 others died amid charges of inadequate medical treatment. The Government reported that it had referred security officials for prosecution in the cases of the death of Sayyed Hassan Fetouh and Hassan Salah Sayyed. At year's end, the officers had not been brought to trial. The Government continued investigations of possible criminal conduct in the 1993 deaths in police custody of Effat Mohammed Ali Wali, al-Muhamdi Mohammed Mohammed Mursi, Mohammed Gomma Abdel Sayyed, Eissa Taher Soliman, and Amre Mohammed Safwat. The Government closed the cases of Ahmed Farouk Ahmed Ali, Abdel Sattar Abdalrah Rashwan, Mohammed Abdel Hamid, and Mohammed Ateya Shamardan, ruling that in the cases of Ali, Hamid, and Shamardan, death occurred as the result of preexisting medical disorders. The death of Rashwan was ruled accidental electrocution. The Government claimed it had no records of the arrests of Bahaa el-Din Abdel Raouf Mohammed, Mohammed Hossain Mohammed, or Ahman Abdel Rahman Mohammed, whose relatives claim they were last seen in police custody. The Government's report on these cases left unanswered several questions raised by the relatives of the deceased persons and human rights groups. The Government stated that it will try to resolve the inconsistencies and provide further information. The press reported that at least 286 people were killed in civil unrest in 1994 compared with 201 in 1993. In antiextremist operations, security forces killed at least 139 suspected extremists, 5 civilian bystanders, and a fellow policeman by friendly fire. The security forces appear to have caused some of these deaths by the excessive use of lethal force. In April security forces in Assiyut opened fire on a taxi stopped at a police roadblock, killing the driver and three passengers, including a woman. The police maintained that one of the passengers tried to kill an officer at the roadblock. However, local human rights monitors believe that the shooting broke out when a policeman's weapon accidentally misfired, provoking others to open fire on the car. In October security forces used lethal force in quelling a demonstration in support of a strike by textile workers (see Section 6.a.). Terrorists killed at least 101 members of the security forces and 40 civilians, including a witness in the trial of persons indicted for the November 1993 assassination attempt on Prime Minister Atef Sedky. In four incidents, extremists attacked foreign tourist groups, killing five tourists and several Egyptian bystanders. In October a suspected terrorist stabbed Naguib Mahfouz, an Egyptian novelist, Nobel laureate, and antifundamentalist critic, in the neck with a knife. Mahfouz survived. As they have in recent years, Islamic extremists targeted Egyptian Christians, attacking churches and other properties owned by Copts, and are believed to have murdered at least nine Copts (see Section 5). Extremist groups took responsibility for the following murders of senior government and police officials: police Brigadier General Raouf Khairat in Cairo on February 10, and the Director of Central Security Forces in Assiyut, General Sherine Ali Fahmi, on February 20. b. Disappearance Mansur Kikhya, a former Libyan Foreign Minister under Colonel Qadhafi and a prominent exiled dissident, disappeared from Cairo in December 1993. The Government has been unable to account for Kikhya's disappearance. Some observers, citing Libya's long history of antidissident campaigns, believe that Libyan operatives abducted Kikhya. Kikhya's whereabouts are still unknown. In December local human rights monitors published a report on disappearances, which claims that 11 people disappeared in 1994 after their arrests. It recounts the unsuccessful efforts by family members and nongovernmental organizations to locate them in the detention system. According to the report, the number of disappearances in 1994 was "unprecedented," compared to three disappearances in 1991 and three in 1993. At year's end, the Government had not yet responded to the report. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment There is convincing evidence that the police and officers of the SSIS systematically practice torture. The law does not adequately protect citizens from physical abuse by security forces. Article 126 of the Penal Code prohibits torture to obtain a confession but is silent on the mistreatment of detainees for other reasons. Punishment for offenders is imprisonment for a maximum of 10 years. A 1-year sentence and a modest fine may be imposed if the injury does not reach the level of bleeding or wounding. However, Article 126 does not address such abuses as blindfolding and prolonged interrogation and handcuffing. The Minister of Interior stated several times in 1994 that torture does not exist in detention facilities. Instances may occur, he said, but they are isolated and not official government policy. The Minister also stated that the authorities investigate all allegations and punish those responsible. Government officials have accused human rights organizations of focusing on the rights of accused terrorists, while ignoring those of the victims of extremist attacks. Officials argued that international human rights groups exaggerate torture reports and that their reporting does not take into account the extreme nature of the security threat. However, the record indicates that the Government does not adequately investigate torture complaints in cases involving suspected terrorists. Since 1985, there is no evidence that officers implicated in such cases have been prosecuted or punished. While the Government has investigated torture complaints in criminal cases and punished some offending officers, the punishments do not necessarily relate to the seriousness of the injury. In August the press reported that a senior SSIS officer received 6 months' imprisonment for permanently crippling a suspect during interrogation. Officers of the SSIS allegedly are responsible for most of the torture used on suspected terrorist detainees. Prisoners report that torture takes place in police stations, SSIS headquarters in Cairo, and the governorates, and at Central Security Force camps. Torture is used to extract information, coerce the victims to end their antigovernment activities, and deter others from such activities. Torture victims are usually taken to a state security office where they are handcuffed, blindfolded, and questioned about their associations, religious beliefs, and political views. Victims have reported the following torture methods: detainees are frequently stripped to their underwear; hung by their wrists with their feet touching the floor or forced to stand for prolonged periods; doused with hot and cold water; beaten; forced to stand outdoors in cold weather; and subjected to electric shocks. Some victims, including female detainees, report they have been raped or threatened with rape; others report that security officers have inserted solid objects, including electric devices, into their anuses. Written records of detainees' whereabouts are not kept while they are in the custody of the state security police, a period which may last 10 days or longer. Records are maintained only after security forces deliver the detainee to a prison. The absence of such a record in the early days of detention invites abuse and effectively blocks the investigation of torture complaints. The security forces also transfer detainees from prisons to other facilities where they are interrogated, tortured, and then returned to prison. No written records are kept on such transfers. To pressure male fugitives to surrender, security forces have taken into custody their relatives, including minors and female family members. An undetermined number of such detainees have been subjected to physical abuse. According to government sources, the prisons have a 400-percent occupancy rate, resulting in unhealthy living conditions, severe overcrowding, and occasional outbreaks of disease. Many of the country's 31 prisons were constructed during the Ottoman era. Prisoners report cells are poorly ventilated, and food is inadequate in quantity and nutritional value. Prison officials occasionally levy collective punishment on inmates, suspending visits and delivery of food to inmates by their families. According to official prison sources, in Qanater women's prison, the prison doctor was prosecuted for sexually molesting 12 female prisoners during examinations. Prisoners reported that prison guards beat a number of women in the aftermath of the scandal, and a sweep of the prison facilities resulted in the confiscation and destruction of many prisoners' clothes and personal belongings. As many as 28 adolescents between the ages of 12 and 17 have reportedly been detained in the Assiyut General Prison, a facility for adults. The charges against the adolescents reportedly include membership in the illegal Islamic Group, monitoring the movements of the police, and attempting to break into a mosque. The adolescents allege that they were blindfolded and tortured at the state security police headquarters in Assiyut or at local police stations in southern Egypt. Torture methods reportedly included suspension, electric shocks, and beatings with sticks. In some cases, electricity was reportedly applied to the penis and tongue. Some of the adolescents have been detained for prolonged periods without trial, in one case since 1993. Prison officials impose particularly harsh living conditions on some categories of prisoners such as Islamic activists. Al-Aqrab prison, which houses security suspects, has been closed to all visitors, including lawyers, since January, despite an administrative court order in April annulling the Ministry of Interior's ban. d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile Arbitrary arrest and detention are commonly used against suspected terrorists and others suspected of threatening national security. However, according to local human rights groups, in some mass security operations, security forces have subjected entire villages to collective punishments, such as curfews and mass arrests. Frequently, the police have taken into custody nonviolent Islamists and persons with no association with extremist groups. Such arrests and detentions are conducted under the State of Emergency which has been in effect since President Sadat's assassination in 1981. In April the People's Assembly renewed the Emergency Law until May 31, 1997. Government supporters claim that the Emergency Law is a temporary measure used only to fight terrorism or drug trafficking. However, the Emergency Law has been in force so long that it has become an important characteristic of the political and legal system and is an impediment to the improvement of the human rights situation. Under the Emergency Law, there is a continuous flow of new arrests and releases from detention. Mass arrests continued in 1994, despite the Minister of Interior's stated intention in 1993 to deemphasize these arrests. Under the Emergency Law, the Interior Minister may detain an individual without indictment for 90 days. Detention orders are issued by public prosecutors who have limited powers to commit individuals to confinement. Some detainees are not allowed to inform their relatives of their detention, and access to legal counsel is frequently delayed. In theory, those arrested under the Emergency Law should be released after 90 days. In practice, the Government rearrests detainees who have been released by court order. The procedure in effect detains them without due process for prolonged periods. Under the Penal Code, arrested persons are charged with violations of specific laws, have the right to a judicial determination of the legality of arrest, and should be formally charged within 48 hours of arrest or be released. Arrests under this procedure occur openly and with warrants issued by a district prosecutor or a judge. There is a system of bail. The Penal Code also gives the State wide detention powers. State prosecutors may obtain court orders to detain individuals for 45 days and to confine them for up to 6 months to complete investigations. Detainees are often released without explanation or acknowledgment that charges have been dropped. The Penal Code contains several provisions to combat extremist violence. These provisions broadly define terrorism to include the acts of "spreading panic" and "obstructing the work of authorities," allow the police to hold suspects for 24 hours before obtaining arrest warrants, and prescribe the death penalty for persons found guilty of terrorism and life imprisonment for membership in a terrorist group. Human rights observers report that the security forces maintain an unauthorized permanent presence in prisons. This practice purportedly violates Article 40 of the Criminal Procedures Code which prohibits contact between intelligence officers and prisoners. SSIS officers reportedly frequently remove prisoners from their cells and take them to other locations for questioning. Official sources estimate the total prison population at 14,000, of which 5,000 are security cases. They note that approximately 4,000 detainees are held without charge. These numbers do not include the undetermined number of persons who are in detention prior to their entrance in the prison system (see Section 1.c.). In May the Government detained 41 lawyers following a demonstration at the Bar Association building in Cairo by lawyers protesting the death in police custody of Abdel Hareth Madani (see Section 1.b.). Some of the detained lawyers were charged with demonstrating illegally and threatening public order, while others, acting as their defense attorneys, were accused of incitement. Some were detained without charge. None was tried. All but one, Montasser Al-Zayyat, were released after 3 to 4 weeks in detention. Al-Zayyat is the self-declared spokesman for the Islamic Group, as well as a well-known attorney who has defended accused extremists, including Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman. State prosecutors ordered his release from detention on December 6; he still faces possible trial on charges of his association with an illegal terrorist organization and contact with terrorists. In other cases, security forces continue to detain at least 150 former defendants who have been acquitted in court. Some have been held for as long as 3 or 4 years. In September the police reportedly arrested hundreds of people to prevent any disruption of the U.N. International Conference on Population and Development, which was held in Cairo. The police targeted extremists who were reportedly planning to attack the conference. In October the police arrested hundreds of persons in Cairo and Hurghada in a security sweep. The arrests followed the September 27 killing at a Red Sea resort town of a German tourist and two Egyptian citizens by suspected terrorists. Human rights observers estimate that 20 Palestinians are in detention. In September the Government released 34 Palestinians at the request of a Palestinian human rights group and expelled them to Gaza. Some Palestinians who are still in detention entered Egypt illegally, while others are legal residents and are under investigation for alleged political activities. Some Palestinian detainees have reportedly been tortured. One Palestinian was executed in 1994 after conviction for involvement in terrorist offenses. e. Denial of Fair Public Trial Although the judiciary in recent years has exercised considerable independence, the Government continued to circumvent the regular court system by trying accused terrorists in military courts, in which they do not receive fair trials. There are three levels of civilian criminal courts: primary courts, appeals courts, and the Court of Cassation, the final stage of criminal appeal. There is also a Supreme Constitutional Court, but its jurisdiction is limited to constitutional challenges. It does not hear criminal appeals. The judicial system is based on the Napoleonic tradition, hence there are no juries. Criminal cases are heard by panels of three judges. Most trials are public. In the civilian court system, the President appoints all judges based on nominations from the Higher Judicial Council, a constitutional body designed to ensure the independence of the judiciary. The Council is composed of senior judges, lawyers, and law professors and is chaired by the President of the Court of Cassation. It regulates judicial promotions, salaries, transfers, and disciplinary actions. In practice, however, the Minister of Justice, an executive branch officer, has considerable influence over judicial appointments and transfers. Judges may be appointed as prosecutors, and vice versa. There are three special courts for crimes considered to touch upon national security: state security courts, courts of ethics, and military courts. The state security courts have jurisdiction over serious offenses, such as armed insurrection. They are divided into upper and lower divisions. Trials are heard by three judges, but two military officers may be added by presidential decree to the upper division. Defendants before a state security court may be indicted under the Penal Code or the Emergency Law. When an indictment is handed down under the Emergency Law, the court is designated an Emergency State Security Court. A defendant has no judicial appeal from an Emergency State Security Court. However, he may file an appeal for clemency from the President, or the Prime Minister acting for the President, who is empowered to amend, commute, or cancel a sentence, or order a retrial. These powers imply that an acquittal may be canceled and the defendant retried for the same offense. The Court of Ethics hears cases prosecuted under Law 95 of 1980 which makes illegal such activities as "endangering the public safety," inciting youth "to depart from religious values and loyalty to the fatherland," and denying the three "heavenly religions." It has an upper and lower division. In recent years, the ethics courts have been used relatively infrequently to try "economic crimes," such as corruption and drug trafficking. An ethics court conviction denies the defendant the right to engage in certain occupations or activities. A person may be tried in a state security court and an ethics court on similar indictments: in the former for criminal offenses and in the latter for the financial gains associated with those offenses. Ethics courts have confiscated financial gains obtained under indictable offenses and may add prison terms to those meted out by state security courts. If the ethics and state security courts reach different verdicts, the defendant may appeal to the President for a pardon. As part of their independence from the Government, judges have ordered inquests into torture cases; acquitted defendants in cases in which confessions were extracted by torture; challenged the ban on workers' strikes; defended the right to nonviolent ideological opinion; overturned bans on prohibited political parties; and overturned an election law that discriminated against independent candidates and ordered dissolved the People's Assembly elected thereunder. Nonetheless, the judiciary is still subject to considerable outside influence. The ethics courts allow nonjurists to try cases. The President may appoint military judges to try cases in the security courts. The executive branch does not always enforce court orders. Detainees may be rearrested under the Emergency Law without formal charge, even if previously released by a court. In 1994, in contrast to previous years, no defendants in terrorism trials were acquitted on the basis of torture, although, according to Egyptian human rights monitors, the majority of such defendants claimed they had been tortured. Since 1992 the Government has tried at least 543 civilian defendants in military courts for terrorist acts or membership in subversive organizations. Defendants have been tried in groups as few as 8 and as many as 32. The Government claims that civilian trials are too lengthy and civilian judges too susceptible to intimidation to warrant their use in terrorist cases. In 1994 the Government referred for trial in military courts at least 97 civilians for terrorist acts or membership in subversive organizations. Through September, these courts sentenced 22 defendants to death, 42 to prison, and acquitted 3. Each military court comprises three military officers. The presiding judge usually has general officer rank. In January 1993, the Supreme Constitutional Court upheld the use of military courts to try civilian cases. It ruled that the President, acting under powers in the Emergency Law, is authorized to refer "any crime" to a military court. The Government maintains that civilian defendants receive fair trials in the military courts. It argues that all military judges have the same legal training as judges in the civilian courts; defense attorneys are accorded sufficient time to review the prosecution's files and inspect the State's evidence; trials are conducted under the same procedures used in civilian courts; defense attorneys have the right to cross-examine and to call any witness; military judges apply only the Penal Code in trying cases involving civilian defendants--no civilian defendant is subject to military law or military punishments; there are adequate safeguards against the admission of confessions obtained under duress; defense attorneys are appointed by the Bar Association at state expense for indigent defendants; verdicts are reviewed by two panels of military judges, who examine the trial procedures before they forward the verdicts to the President for ratification; and all defendants have a constitutional right to appeal to the President for clemency.